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Abstract
We study the dynamics of a game-theoretic network formation
model that yields large-scale small-world networks. So far,
mostly stochastic frameworks have been utilized to explain
the emergence of these networks. On the other hand, it is
natural to seek for game-theoretic network formation models in
which links are formed due to strategic behaviors of individuals,
rather than based on probabilities. Inspired by Even-Dar and
Kearns (2007), we consider a more realistic model in which the
cost of establishing each link is dynamically determined during
the course of the game. Moreover, players are allowed to put
transfer payments on the formation of links. Also, they must
pay a maintenance cost to sustain their direct links during the
game. We show that there is a small diameter of at most 4 in
the general set of equilibrium networks in our model. Unlike
earlier model, not only the existence of equilibrium networks is
guaranteed in our model, but also these networks coincide with
the outcomes of pairwise Nash equilibrium in network formation.
Furthermore, we provide a network formation simulation that
generates small-world networks. We also analyze the impact of
locating players in a hierarchical structure by constructing a
strategic model, where a complete b-ary tree is the seed network.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
In recent years, networks have been extensively studied mostly in terms
of their structure, but also their formation and dynamics. Structural
characteristics of various networks, which emerge from disciplines, such
as economics, computer science, sociology, biology and physics, have been
investigated. Many of these networks, in spite of their different origins,
indicate large commonalities among their key structural properties, such
as small diameter1, high clustering coefficient2, and heavy-tailed degree
distribution3. An exciting challenge is to study network formation models
capable of explaining how and why these structural commonalities both
occur and evolve.
The series of experiments by Milgram and his colleagues in the 1960’s4
were among the pioneering works that quantified the small-world phe-
nomenon, the principle that individuals are all linked by short chains of
connections and acquaintances. They introduced the concept of “six de-
grees of separation”. In particular, these experiments target the anecdotal
1The diameter of a network is the maximum distance between any two players, where
the distance between two vertices or players in a network is defined to be the number of
links in a shortest path connecting them.
2This measures the frequency with which two neighbors of a given vertex are them-
selves connected.
3These degree distributions are often quantified by power-law probability distribu-
tions.
4See Milgram (1967), Travers and Milgram (1969), and Korte and Milgram (1970).
1
observation in societies in which individuals often meet strangers and then
discover that they actually have a friend in common, or are connected
through a short sequence of acquaintances. These experiments performed
over many trials showed that between any two individuals in a network, with
everyone having a local information and possibly some limited long range
information, there are a small number of intermediate people with median
of six. Recent experiments5 showed that today’s online social networks
such as Facebook indicate that the degree of separation (for almost any two
individuals in a given database) must be even smaller than four.
The small-world model by Watts and Strogatz (1998) was one of the
first models which generates networks with small diameter. This model
starts by positing nodes in a ring lattice, introduces local connections, and
proceeds by rewiring some of the local links to randomly chosen distant
nodes. Kleinberg (2000) followed this work in a study that showed Watts-
Strogatz model fails to satisfy the existence of a decentralized routing
mechanism among other shortcomings. Kleinberg’s stochastic model was
located in a grid. It introduced a process that adds links with distance
d to the grid with a probability proportional to 1/dα. He showed the
existence of a fast routing in this model when α = 2. In order to extend
the quality of efficient decentralized search in other structures, Kleinberg
(2001) developed a hierarchical model using a complete b-ary tree, and
obtained similar qualitative results. This model was further investigated
by Watts et al. (2002) where they targeted the quality of searchability and
demonstrated searchable networks.
These models, however, are not applicable when there is a strategical
5See Daraghmi and Yuan (2014).
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purpose in players’ making or losing their connections and when players
strategically establish or sever their connections to obtain an advantageous
position in the social structure. Moreover, understanding how these strate-
gic decisions form the social networks is crucial in characterizing the main
structural properties of social networks. In addition, the structure of social
networks plays an important and determining role in economic outcomes
of individuals within a wide range of discussed problems in reality includ-
ing educational achievement, homophily in social networks, employment,
welfare programs, adoption of technology, crime, smoking, labor market,
and health.6 Consequently, we refer to a class of game-theoretic network
formation, also known as strategic network formation (See Goyal (2007),
Jackson (2008), DeMarti and Zenou (2009), and Jackson and Zenou (2014)
for comprehensive surveys). Models in this class generally assume that
players make connections based on a utility maximization and treat the
network as the equilibrium result of the strategic interactions among players.
Generally, an act of a player is choosing (and therefore accepting the
cost of it) to connect to other players in her network in order to maximize
her objective. For example, the objective of each player is minimizing
her collective distances to other players in work of Even-Dar and Kearns
(2007), and obtaining high clustering coefficient in work of Brautbar and
Kearns (2011). Such a model has been studied in different directions of
studies in Fabrikant et al. (2003), Anshelevich et al. (2004), Johari et al.
(2006), Albers et al. (2006), Demaine et al. (2007), Even-Dar et al. (2007),
Halevi and Mansour (2007), Kleinberg et al. (2008), Laoutaris et al. (2008),
6 (See the following works about the mentioned topics, respectively. Sacerdote (2001),
Kim (2013), Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2009), DeGiorgi et al. (2010), Topa (2001), Rege
et al. (2012), Conley and Udry (2010), Sirakaya (2006) Nakajima (2007), Bayer et al.
(2008), Christakis and Fowler (2007).
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Anshelevich et al. (2008), and Bei et al. (2009).
The notion of stability characterizes the outcomes of individuals’ inter-
actions in game-theoretic settings. The path for studying this notion was
first discussed by Gale and Shapley (1962). This was further developed
to the stability notions in networks such as pairwise stability by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996), non-cooperative stability by Bala and Goyal (2000),
pairwise stability with transfers by Bloch and Jackson (2006) and (2007),
pairwise Nash stability by Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic (2009), strong pair-
wise stability and strict pairwise stability by Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007),
and non-cooperative k-player Nash stability by Badev (2013). See Hellman
et al. (2012) for a comprehensive survey in this area.
1.2 Our contribution
This thesis develops a strategic network formation model that demonstrates
the main characteristics of social networks. Studies of network formation
models from a game-theoretic perspective are in their early stages. This may
be rooted in the intrinsic characteristics of social networks: their complex
nature and the consequent difficulty for individuals in the decision making
about their connections. Our work contributes to this promising line of
research. Our game-theoretic network formation model is mainly inspired
by Even-Dar and Kearns (2007). In their model, players, i.e., nodes, seek
to minimize their collective distances to all other players. The network
formation starts from a grid network. It is costly to form a link. The cost
of establishing each link in this model is considered to be the grid distance
between the incident players of that link to the power of α, where α is
the parameter of the model. Both link creation and link severance are
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considered unilateral by players. In addition, the equilibrium is defined
in terms of link stability: no players benefit from altering a single link in
their link decisions. Even-Dar and Kearns’ model achieves small diameter
link stable networks within the threshold of α = 2. However, they faced an
unbounded diameter that grows with the number of players when α > 2.
In this thesis, we extend Even-Dar and Kearns’ model in several direc-
tions. We define three types of costs for links: (i) the link-price, (ii) the
maintenance cost, and (iii) the transfer payment. The link-price pij is the
price of purchasing and forming link ij between its incident players i and j.
Only the initiator of connection would bear its payment, which is a one-time
charge when establishing the link. Moreover, we introduce a new viewpoint
to this game that better echoes with reality by constructing a dynamic
link-pricing. When characterizing the formation of a network, the involved
dynamics is a crucial and determining element. We aim to effectuate the
impact of this dynamics in our model with the revised link-pricing. We
update the used distances of each pair of players in the related link-prices
from the current network rather than sticking with the initial grid distances.
In addition, we introduce maintenance costs to make the model more
real where a player can give up her payment and sever her connection.
Also, it is reasonable to assume that refunding the link-prices may not be
possible in lots of real-world scenarios. Hence, maintenance costs make the
link severance scenario well-defined. In our model, player i is charged for
all of its incident links by considering recurring maintenance costs cij. In
other words, for each decision made in the game, players should take the
maintenance cost of their incident links into their consideration. Lastly, we
allow individuals to put transfer payments on their links. Transfer payments
5
play an important role in formation of many real-life social and economic
networks. In fact, without transfer or side payments, many agreements on
these connections would simply never exist.
Another extension in our model relates to the equilibrium notion. Even-
Dar and Kearns (2007) used the concept of link stability, which provides the
link stable networks that are stable under single edge unilateral deviations
(link addition or link deletion). However, this unilateral notion is not
compatible with the cooperative nature of network formation, where link
formation practically needs the bilateral consent of incident players. To
account for this cooperative nature, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced
the notion of pairwise stability (see Definition 5). In pairwise stable networks,
there is no mutually beneficial link that is left aside and no player has an
incentive to delete one of her own current links.
In this thesis, we use the notion of Pairwise Stability with direct and
indirect transfers (PSt)7 as our equilibrium notion. This notion has the
desirable simplicity required for analyzing players’ best response computa-
tions.8
On the other hand, due to the bilateral agreement for any link formation,
the typical notion of Nash equilibria has some drawbacks in terms of
coordination failures; e.g. an empty network is always a Nash equilibrium. In
other words, Nash equilibria networks can contain some mutually beneficial
link that are left aside. To solve this coordination problem when employing
7The pairwise stability is the major notion of stability that assumes myopic players
and has been studied in related literature. In a linking game with transfers, it was first
introduced as an extension by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and then developed by Bloch
and Jackson (2006) and (2007).
8Computing the players’ best response computations under the more general notion
of Nash equilibria within some similar models such as the Myerson’s game in Myerson
(1991) and a linking game in Fabrikant et al. (2003) are proved to be NP-hard.
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Nash equilibria, the notion of pairwise Nash stability9 was introduced.
Pairwise Nash Stable (PNSt) networks are at the intersection of the set of
Nash equilibrium networks and the set of pairwise stable networks.
In this thesis, we not only guarantee the existence of pairwise stable
networks10, but also demonstrate that, in our model, the set of pairwise
stable networks coincide with the set of pairwise Nash stable networks.
Finally, we show that the general set of equilibrium networks exhibits a
short diameter of at most four.
In addition, we construct a set of network formation simulations that
shows the impact of dynamic link pricing and the maintenance cost on
achieving small world networks. In particular, the outcomes of these network
formation simulations demonstrate small diameters as expected, considerable
high clustering coefficients, and power-law degree distributions.
Finally, we develop a hierarchical network formation model by taking a
complete b-ary tree as the starting network. In this model, each player is
located in a leaf node of the tree. The link prices are defined bαd where b is
the division factor of tree and d is the specific defined distances between
players. We point out that this game can be progressed when α ∈ (0, 1). We
show a diameter of at most 2 for any equilibrium network in both models
of dynamic and fixed link-pricing when α ≤ 1/4.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we explain
the required preliminaries and notations for our model. In Chapter 3, we
give our analysis about the grid-based model of Even-Dar and Kearns.
We then provide the analysis for our grid-based model with dynamic link-
9See Bloch and Jackson (2006), and (2007), Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic (2009), and
Hellman (2012).
10It can be seen that the condition for ruling out the potential cycles from Jackson
and Watts (2001) can be adapted in our linking game with transfers.
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pricing and transfer payments in Chapter 4. The outcome of our network
formation simulations is provided in Chapter 5. We provide the hierarchical
model in Chapter 6 and present the conclusion of this thesis and further
research directions in Chapter 7. Also, the programing code for the network
formation simulation is provided in the Appendix.
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2. Preliminaries and notations
In this chapter, we provide the general notations and preliminaries for our
arguments in this thesis.
In general, a game consists of the following three elements: a set of
players, a set of available actions or strategies for each player, and a set of
utility functions for players. The utility functions represent and quantify
each player’s preferences over the available strategies. Moreover, a profile
of strategies denotes a list of chosen actions, one for each player.
2.1 The network and players
A network consists of a set of individuals or players and a mapping of their
relations. A network can be mathematically represented by vertices and
edges or links in a graph. A graph H is an ordered pair (V (H), E(H))
consisting of V (H), a set of vertices and E(H) a set of unordered pair of
vertices or edges of H. Each edge or link has two incident vertices or end
points. Multiple edges are edges with the same incident vertices. A graph
is simple, if it has no multiple edges. Moreover, an undirected graph is one
in which edges have no orientation. In this thesis, a networks is represented
by a simple and undirected graph.
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of n players forming a network G. Net-
work G is undirected and includes a list of pairs of players who are linked to
9
each other. Link ij ∈ G indicates that player i and player j are linked in G.
Let GN denote the complete network. The set G =
{
G ⊆ GN} consists of all
possible networks on N . We define network G0 to be the starting network of
the game that is referred to the seed network. The set of neighbors of player i
in G is Ni(G) = {j|ij ∈ G}. Similarly, Li(G) = {ij ∈ G | j ∈ Ni(G)} de-
notes the set of links which are incident with player i in G. If l is a subset
of Li(G), then G− l is the network resulted by removing the existing links
in the set of links l from G. Similarly, if l = {ij | j /∈ Ni(G), j 6= i}, then
the network G+ l is obtained by adding the links in set of links l to G.
The utility of network G for player i is given by a function ui : G → R+.
We normalize the payoffs by setting the payoff of each player from the
empty network to be zero: ui(∅) = 0. Let u denote the vector of utility
functions u = (u1, ..., un) such that u : G → RN . Also, the value of a
network, v(G), is the summation of all players’ utilities in the network G;
i.e. v(G) =
∑n
i=1 ui(G). For any network G and any subset li(G) ⊆ Li(G),
the marginal utility for a player i and a set of links li(G) is denoted by
mui(G, li(G)) = ui(G)− ui(G− li(G)).
2.2 Strategies; transfer payments
Each player i ∈ N announces an action vector of transfers ti ∈ Rn(n−1)/2.
The entries in this vector indicate the transfer payment that player i offers
(to pay) or demands (to gain) on the link jk. If i ∈ {j, k}, then we call
it a direct transfer payment. Otherwise, it is called an indirect transfer
payment. Typically, individuals can make demands or offers on their direct
connections. However, they can only make offers (and not demands) on the
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indirect transfer payments.11 A positive transfer tijk > 0 means that i offers
this payment for establishing jk. Conversely, when tijk < 0, it must be the
case that i ∈ {j, k}, which indicates i demands the transfer payment to
keep the link jk. In addition, a link jk is formed if and only if
∑
i∈N t
i
jk ≥ 0.
Thus, the profile of strategies or the announced vectors of transfer payments
for all players is defined: t = (t1, ..., tn). Consequently, the network G,
which is formed by this profile of strategies t, can be denoted as follows:
G(t) = {jk |∑i∈N tijk ≥ 0, where j, k ∈ N}.
2.3 The payoff structure and costs
The distance between a pair of players i and j in G, denoted by dG(i, j), is
defined as the length of a shortest path between i and j in G. Similar to
the model of Even-Dar and Kearns, players seek to benefit by minimizing
their total distances to all players in the network. This benefit would be
considered for each player with respect to the network G. Also, links benefit
both incident players.12 The link-price is defined as pij = dG(i, j)
α for α > 0.
The link-price function is non-decreasing and follows Kleinberg’s stochastic
model. Also, function cij denotes the maintenance cost for the link ij. The
utility function of player i is the negative of her total distances and links
11This comes from the observation in a majority of real settings, which players cannot
prevent the establishment of connections between two other players in the network. In
this work, we stick to this convention and do not consider the extension, where individuals
can pay others not to form a connection, which is introduced by Bloch and Jackson
(2006). This assumption is reasonable in our framework, since the formation of other
links cannot hurt the utility of non-involved players with respect to the distance-based
structure of our utility function in (2.1).
12See e.g. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Bloch and Jackson (2007), and Fabrikant
et al. (2003) for some instances of applying distance-based payoff structures.
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expenses:
ui(G(t)) = −
∑
j∈N
dG(t)(i, j)−
∑
j∈Ni
(pij + cij)−
∑
jk∈G(t)
tijk. (2.1)
Typically, there is also an assumption that the links of the seed network
are defined to have a link-price of 0 and thus, they are included in G as well
as G0. Players however, should pay the maintenance cost for these links
and hence, they treat them similar to other established links.
2.4 The dynamic process
Unlike the simultaneous linking game with transfers by Bloch and Jackson
(2006) and (2007), players make their choice of transfer payments sequen-
tially and revise them frequently in our model. Jackson and Watts (2001)
introduced the notion of improving path that represents a desired process
for dynamical network formation models.
Definition 1. An improving path represents a sequence of changes from
one network to another. The changes, which form this sequence, are either
a single link creation or a single link severance by the endpoint players of
the link based on improving their utilities.
If two networks G and G′ differ in exactly one link (i.e., they are
connected consecutively in an improving path), they are said to be adjacent
networks. Also, if there exists an improving path from G to G′, then G′
defeats G. In each round of the game, one player adapts her strategy with
respect to the current state of the network. We assume a random meeting
mechanism, introduced by Watts (2001) and Jackson and Watts (2002), but
we start with a seed network instead of an empty network. In this random
12
meeting, at each iteration, two players i and j are chosen randomly, and
make their choice of transfer payments.
2.5 The equilibrium notion
2.5.1 The equilibrium strategies
In every equilibrium profile of strategies t∗, there is no excess in the offer of
transfer payment. A transfer payment t∗iij is negative if and only if there is a
utility gap for player i in creation or maintenance of link ij. Also, player i
can only use a payment equal to her utility gap. Furthermore, a transfer
payment t∗ijk is non-negative if and only if (i) player i gains a benefit from
either establishing a direct link jk or maintaining a direct or indirect link jk
and (ii) at least one of the players j or k has a utility gap in establishing
or maintaining link jk. Hence, for an equilibrium profile of strategies t∗,
which forms equilibrium network G,
G(t∗) = {jk |∑i∈N t∗ijk = 0, where j, k ∈ N}.
We would like to indicate that potential generalization of transfers’
distribution among players are not among the main focuses of this thesis.13
2.5.2 Definitions of equilibrium notions
We provide the formal definitions of equilibrium notions in following.
Definition 2. Let u−iji (G) be player i’s utility function prior to including
the transfer payment for link ij. A network G is Pairwise Stable with
13See Gallo (2012) and Bayati et al. (2011) for some instances of study in the case of
bargaining between players on network. In fact, despite the rich literature in general for
bargaining between players, bargaining on networks is in its early attempts.
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transfers (PSt) with respect to a profile of utility functions u and a profile
of strategies t that creates network G if
(a) ∀i, j ∈ N , ij ∈ G =⇒ u−iji (G)+u−ijj (G) ≥ u−iji (G− ij)+u−ijj (G− ij),
(b) ∀i, j ∈ N , ij /∈ G =⇒ u−iji (G)+u−ijj (G) ≥ u−iji (G+ ij)+u−ijj (G+ ij).
We can also define the notion of PSt by using the original utility
function u(.) after adding the transfer payments for the intended link ij.
So, the network G is PSt, if
(a) ij ∈ G =⇒ ui(G) ≥ ui(G− ij) as well as uj(G) ≥ uj(G− ij),
(b) ij /∈ G =⇒ ui(G) ≥ ui(G+ ij) as well as uj(G) ≥ uj(G+ ij).
In our model, we refer equilibrium networks to the pairwise stable
networks with transfers.
Nash equilibrium is a pivotal concept in game theory and it is one of the
most widely used method of predicting the outcome of a strategic interaction
in the various settings among a society of rational individuals. A profile of
strategies or actions is called a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, if no single
individual can gain a higher payoff by unilaterally deviating from her action
in this profile.14
A pure strategy profile t∗ = (t∗1, ..., t∗n) forms a Nash equilibrium in
the linking game with transfers if
u(G(ti, t∗−i)) ≤ u(G(t∗))
holds for all i ∈ N and all ti ∈ Ti, where t∗−i is the equilibrium strategy
for all players in t∗ other than player i, and Ti is the set of all available
strategies for player i.
14The other type of equilibrium is mixed strategy Nash equilibrium that is not applied
in this thesis. In this type of equilibrium, players play their available pure strategies
with certain probabilities.
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A network G is Nash Stable with transfers (NSt) with respect to a
profile of utility functions u if there exists a Nash equilibrium t such that
G = G(t). Network G is also called to be supported by a Nash equilibrium
We can also indicate that in the context of network formation, a net-
work G is Nash stable if and only if for all i ∈ N , and li(G) ⊆ Li(G):
ui(G) ≥ ui(G− li(G)). (2.2)
The single player deviations in Nash equilibrium strategies can only include
severance of a set of current links. This is because each link addition needs
the consent of the two incident players, hence cannot be considered in the
single player deviation of Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, the notion
of pairwise Nash equilibrium with transfers allows pairs of players who are
not linked in the network to jointly change their transfer payments. As a
result, a link is established if and only if it is mutually beneficial for its
incident players in the linking game with transfers.
Definition 3. A pure strategy profile t∗ = (t∗1, ..., t∗n) forms a pairwise
Nash equilibrium in the linking game with transfers if
1. it is a Nash equilibrium, and
2. there does not exist any ij /∈ G(t∗), and t ∈ T such that
(a) ui(G(t
i
ij, t
j
ij, t
∗
−ij)) ≥ ui(G(t∗)),
(b) uj(G(t
i
ij, t
j
ij, t
∗
−ij)) ≥ uj(G(t∗)), and
(c) at least one of (1) or (2) holds strictly,
where T is the set of all possible strategies and t∗−ij is the vector that is
found by deleting t∗iij and t
∗j
ij from vector t
∗. A network G is Pairwise Nash
15
Stable with transfers (PNSt) with respect to a profile of utility functions u,
if there exists a pairwise Nash equilibrium t such that G = G(t).
Let G be a network in family of pairwise Nash stable networks with a
profile of utility functions u, or G ⊂ PNSt(u). Thus, G is immune to the
formation of a new link by any two players, and the deletion of any number
of links by any player. From Definition 3, it is clear that for any profile of
utility functions u,
PNSt(u) = NS(u)
⋂
PSt(u).
2.6 A note on myopic players
The strategic interaction that is the focus of this thesis (and in particular,
the class of one-coordinate notions of stability including pairwise stability)
follows a typical assumption of myopic or nearsighted players in many
related works15. This is a widely used assumption in the game theory
literature. In particular, under this assumption, players do their best
response computations by considering the current state of game rather than
on the ability to forecast the actions of others. For instance, consider the
scenario in which player i decides to form a link with player j because of her
prediction that player j would be connected to some player k in the future.
This scenario or sort of consideration cannot happen under the assumption
of myopic players.
This assumption is indeed a well-fit grasp of reality, since we target the
formation of large-scale and anonymous networks, where players’ information
15See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Watts (2001), Jackson and Watts (2002), and
Gilles and Sarangi (2005).
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Figure 2.1: An example of a sub-network from network G during the dynamic
process
might be limited and local. As a result, nearsighted or myopic behavior is
a reasonable starting point for our analysis.
2.7 A tutorial example
Suppose that Figure 2.1 shows a small sub-network of a network G that is
obtained through an improving path. Also, assume that player i considers
establishing a link to player j in the next random meeting. For this
example, let α = 2 and c19 = c91 = 10. Furthermore, Bi(G + ij, ij) =
−∑u6=i(dG+ij(i, u) − dG(i, u)) defines the benefit of reduced distances in
G that player i is received after adding link ij to G. We assume that
Bi(G+ ij, ij) = 30 and Bj(G+ ij, ij) = 5 in this example.
According to the dynamic link-pricing, pij = 3
2 = 9. First, we can
verify that player i has an incentive to buy link ij, as Bi(G+ ij, ij) = 30 ≥
9 + 10 = 19. However, there is no advantage for player j in this linking,
as Bj(G+ ij, ij) = 5 < 10. Therefore, player j must demand the transfer
payment tjij = −5 for covering her utility gap. Player i can offer the transfer
payment tiij = 10 − 5 = 5 to player j, since creating ij is still beneficial
for i, as 30 ≥ 5 + 19 = 24. Consequently, link ij can be added to G and
network G′ is achieved along the improving path of game. Note that we
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can also consider the indirect transfers that other players may offer for this
linkage, which is not stated in this example for simplicity.
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3. The fixed link-pricing model of Even-Dar and Kearns
3.1 Overview
Even-Dar and Kearns (2007) considered a model with a
√
n×√n grid for
its seed graph. They defined the link-price pij = dG0(i, j)
α, for α > 0. Their
model defines dG0(i, j) to be the grid distance of i and j. Consequently, the
link prices are fixed during the course of the game in this model. We first
describe the setup for this model and then provide the description for our
extension.
This model defines the set si ∈ {0, 1}n−1 to be the action set of player i.
Each of these binary variables correspond to another player distinct from i.
Furthermore, sij is one when player i creates a link to player j. It is zero
when there is not such link. Also, each link benefits both endpoints and
sij = 1 iff sji = 1. A profile of actions is denoted by s = s1 × s2 × · · · × sn.
The utility function for player i ∈ N is as follows:
ui(G(s)) = −
∑
j 6=i
dG0(i, j)−
∑
j∈Ni
pij. (3.1)
In this model, link creation is unilateral. In other words, creation of
a link only requires agreement of at least one of the endpoint players of
the link. There is no transfer payment and maintenance cost in this model.
Also, players can receive a refund of the link-prices given the severance of
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links. Moreover, this model uses the notion of link stability. Link stable
networks are immune against unilateral creation or severance of a single
link by each player.
Even-Dar and Kearns proved that the set of link stable networks has
a constant diameter for α < 2, and a small constant diameter of 5 and
2 da2 + 4e, respectively, when α < 1 and when α = 1, where pij = adG0(i, j).
Finally, they provide an upper bound of O(
√
n
2/
√
logn
) for the diameter,
when α = 2 and a lower bound of Ω(
√
n
α−2
α+1 ) in the case of α > 2.
One of the shortcomings of this model concerns the fact that this network
formation may not converge to a link stable network. In other words, there
exists the possibility for formation of cycles in the evolving networks during
this network formation model.16
Generally, the existence of negative externalities can be stated as one of
the potential reasons in the formation of cycles in linking games. Negative
externalities points to the situations when a player’s utility can be hurt by
the actions (link creation or link severance) of other players in network.
Consider the following grid-based example shown in Figure 3.1. In this
example, we can observe the formation of a cycle in the game.
Assume that 48 < 3α < 49. First, it is easy to verify that player s has
an incentive to create link st. Now a cycle of strategical updates may be
formed as follows. Player u saves 57 in
∑n
i=1 dG(s)(u, vi) as it can be verified
that the distance to u of 9 players in area i is reduced by 1 and the distance
to u of 24 players in area ii is reduced by 2. So, (I) player u has an incentive
to buy link uv, as puv = dG0(u, v)
α = 3α < 9 + 48 = 57. Then with similar
observations, it can be seen that the following strategical changes will be
16Refer to Definition 7 for defining cycles in network formation.
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Figure 3.1: In this example, the game may not converge to a link stable graph.
made in this order. (II) player w buys link wu as pwu = dG0(w, u)
α = 3α <
49. (III) player u is no longer willing to maintain link uv, as with existing
link wu, it has a benefit of only 48. Therefore, u returns the link uv. (IV)
player w has no incentive to retain link wu, as with the removal of link uv,
it has a benefit of only 34. So, w returns the link wu. Thus, a cycle of steps
(I) to (IV) may be formed and the game does not converge to stability. The
example can be expanded to a large-scale grid as well.
We can note that player w, by establishing wu, creates a negative
externality for u. Since it causes a reduction in player u’s utility, u decides
to sever uv that in overall leads to the formation of a cycle.
3.2 Forbidding link severance
Besides the difficulties of equilibrium convergence in the model of Even-Dar
and Kearns, there are reasons that make the option of removing links not
well-defined in the link stability. In this model, there is no maintenance cost
that charges all incident players to each link for its payment, and also the
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link purchases are unilateral. As a result, players should be allowed to sever
only those links that they themselves have purchased. However, this issue
is not clear in the link stability for the setup of this model. Moreover, there
are various real settings that one may not gain a refund for link-prices that
she has already covered, but rather, we would like to refer to our model in
Chapter 4 as a reasonable extension that include a charging scheme for the
maintenance of existing links. In that model, one may decide to lose a link
in order to save the maintenance cost. Before providing the main results
in our model in Chapter 4, we would like to first consider an extension of
Even-Dar and Kearns’ model with forbidding severing links and point out
its consequent outcome.
Forbidding players to sever their links, although limits the applicability
of model to reality, makes the convergence of equilibrium networks possible
for the network formation.
Proposition 1. Under the assumption of forbidding link severance in the
linking game in Even-Dar and Kearns (2007), the convergence of model to
link stability is guaranteed.
Proof. After forbidding the option of link severance, the existence of negative
externalities for player is ruled out. In other words, there is no player such
that her utility can be hurt during the game. Thus, the value of network
is increased by each change during the dynamic process. This points to
the exact pairwise monotonicity, introduced by Jackson and Watts (2001),
which is the condition that guarantees the existence of stable networks. The
complementary argument about this condition is provided in Section 4.2.
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4. Dynamic link-pricing model with transfers
In this chapter, we first characterize the set of pairwise stable networks in our
linking game with dynamic link-pricing and transfer payments. In particular,
we show that given the utility function u(.) in (2.1), (1): the family of
networks in PSt(u) satisfies strictly pairwise stability, (2): existence of
networks in PSt(u) is guaranteed and formation of cycles in our dynamic
process is ruled out, and (3): the outcomes of pairwise stable networks
with transfers in our network formation coincide with the family of pairwise
Nash stable networks. We then provide our analysis on the diameter of the
equilibrium networks in this model.
4.1 Notions of pairwise stability
Notions of strongly and strictly pairwise stability are first described by Gilles
and Sarangi (2005) and Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007). These notions are
developed variations of pairwise stability in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Definition 4. Let u be a profile of utility functions and t be a profile of
strategies that creates network G.
(a) A network G is link deletion proof for u,
if ∀i ∈ N and ∀j ∈ Ni(G), ui(G) ≥ ui(G− ij).
The family of link deletion proof networks for u is denoted by D(u) ⊂ GN
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(b) A network G is strong link deletion proof for u,
if ∀i ∈ N and ∀li(G) ⊆ Li(G), ui(G) ≥ ui(G− li(G).
The family of strong link deletion proof networks for u is denoted by
Ds(u) ⊂ GN .
(c) A network G is link addition proof for u,
if ∀i ∈ N with ij /∈ G, if ui(G+ ij) > ui(G), then uj(G+ ij) < uj(G).
The family of link addition proof networks for u is denoted by A(u) ⊂ GN
(d) A network G is strict link addition proof for u,
if ∀i ∈ N , ij /∈ G, implies ui(G+ ij) < ui(G) as well as uj(G+ ij) <
uj(G).
The family of strict link addition proof networks for u is denoted by
As(u) ⊂ GN
Definition 5. Let u be a profile of utility functions and t be a profile of
strategies that creates network G.
(a) Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), a network G is pairwise stable
for u, if G is link deletion proof as well as link addition proof.
The family of pairwise stable networks for u is denoted by
P (u) =
(
D(u)
⋂
A(u)
)
⊂ GN .
(b) A network G is strongly pairwise stable for u, if G is strong link deletion
proof as well as link addition proof.
The family of pairwise stable networks for u is denoted by
Ps(u) =
(
Ds(u)
⋂
A(u)
)
⊂ GN .
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(c) A network G is strictly pairwise stable for u, if G is strong link deletion
proof as well as strict link addition proof.
The family of strictly pairwise stable networks for u is denoted by
P ?(u) =
(
Ds(u)
⋂
As(u)
)
⊂ GN .
Let G ∈ PSt(u), then for any link ij /∈ G, neither player i nor j can
benefit from creating link ij. This is one of the impact of allowing players
to put transfer payments on the links. Thus, pairwise stable networks with
transfers are strict link addition proof. In order to progress our argument,
we need to provide the following definition and lemma.
Definition 6. Let α ≥ 0. A utility function u(.) is α-submodular in own
current links on A ⊆ G if ∀i ∈ N,G ∈ A, and li(G) ⊆ Li(G), it holds that
mui(G, li(G)) ≥ α
∑
ij∈li(G) mui(G, ij).
The case α = 1 corresponds to submodularity, which is also called super-
additivity by Bloch and Jackson (2006). The condition in α-submodularity
points out that the joint returns from a group of existing connections in
the network should be higher than the sum of the marginal returns of each
single connection, scaled by α.
The following lemma shows that the utility function in our model locates
in the category of submodular utility functions.
Lemma 1. The utility defined in (2.1) is submodular in own current links.
Proof. The proof is inspired by the argument in Gallo (2012). First, we
show the related inequality in Definition 6 holds for the case when the
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subset li(G) consists of two distinct links ij and ik. This indicates the
below inequality.
(4.1)mui(G, ij + ik) ≥ mui(G, ij) +mui(G, ik)
If we consider any player like u in G, the distance between i and u (dG(i, u))
contributes to the distance expenses in i’s utility. It is important to note
that removing any link like ij or ik from G cannot decrease this distance,
however if the removed link belongs to the shortest path between i and u
in G, then the distance would be increased. This argument can be extended
to the case of removing two links such as ij and ik from G, hence
dG(i, u) ≤ dG−ij(i, u) ≤ dG−ij−ik(i, u) (4.2)
and
dG(i, u) ≤ dG−ik(i, u) ≤ dG−ij−ik(i, u). (4.3)
In computing the marginal utilities of networks G−ik,G−ij, and G−ij−ik,
we should note that the link-prices of removed links cannot be refunded for
player i. Let Bi(G, l) = −
∑
u6=i(dG(i, u)− dG−l(i, u)).
(4.4)
mui(G, ij) = −
∑
u6=i
(dG(i, u)− dG−ij(i, u))− cij − tiij
= Bi(G, ij)− cij − tiij
(4.5)
mui(G, ik) = −
∑
u6=i
(dG(i, u)− dG−ik(i, u))− cik − tiik
= Bi(G, ik)− cik − tiik
(4.6)
mui(G, ij + ik) =−
∑
u6=i
(dG(i, u)−dG−ij−ik(i, u))−cij−cik− tiij− tiik
= Bi(G, ij + ik)− cij − cik − tiij − tiik
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First, we should note that the direct transfer payment for each link is
determined according to the gained utility from that link by its incident
players. Therefore, the transfer payments tiij and t
i
ik in Inequality (4.6) are
equal to their correspondence in Inequalities (4.4) and (4.5).
Moreover, there is no u such that Bi(G, ij) 6= 0 and Bi(G, ik) 6= 0. To
observe this, consider a player u such that Bi(G, ij) < 0. This indicates u
passes from ij in her shortest path (p1) to i. Now if the statement Bi(G, ik)
is non-zero (and hence negative), there must be another shortest path (p2)
from u to i that passes from ik. Therefore, the length of both shortest paths
should be equal, |p1|= |p2|. However, this makes a contradiction with the
fact that both Bi(G, ij) and Bi(G, ik) are negative. As a result, according
to Inequalities (4.2) and (4.3), it holds that:
Bi(G, ij + ik) ≥ Bi(G, ij) +Bi(G, ik). (4.7)
Consequently, it can be shown that Inequality (4.1) is satisfied by substitut-
ing the values of marginal utilities from Inequalities (4.4), (4.5), and (4.6).
This argument can be extended for any subset li(G), hence the utility
function u(.) is submodular in own current link.
Let PSt(u) be the family of pairwise stable networks in the linking game
with transfers that is formed with the profile of strategies t.
Proposition 2. Given a profile of utility functions u in (2.1),
PSt(u) = P ?(u).
Proof. According to Definition 5 and the definition of networks in PSt(u), it
can be derived that P ?(u) ⊆ PSt(u). We further prove that PSt(u) ⊆ P ?(u).
If G ∈ P ?(u), then it is strict link addition proof as well as strong link
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deletion proof. From the definition of pairwise stable networks in linking
game with transfers, strict link-proofness can be directly pointed out. Recall
that networks in PSt(u) must satisfy the following conditions.
(a) ij ∈ G =⇒ ui(G) ≥ ui(G− ij) as well as uj(G) ≥ uj(G− ij),
(b) ij /∈ G =⇒ ui(G) ≥ ui(G+ ij) as well as uj(G) ≥ uj(G+ ij).
What it remains to prove is that networks in PSt(u) are strong link
deletion proof. In other words, if G ∈ PSt(u), it implies that ∀i ∈ N , and
∀li(G) ⊆ Li(G), ui(G) ≥ ui(G− li(G)).
We can infer from the condition (a) for networks in PSt(u) that ∀i ∈ N ,
and ∀j ∈ li(G), ui(G − ij) ≤ ui(G). Assume there are k links in the
subset li(G), hence
∑
ij∈li(G) ui(G− ij) ≤ (k)ui(G).
On the other hand, based on Lemma 1,∑
ij∈li(G) mui(G, ij) ≤ mui(G, li(G)) =⇒
(k)ui(G)−
∑
ij∈li(G)
ui(G− ij) ≤ ui(G)− ui(G− li(G)). (4.8)
Since the left-hand side of Inequality (4.8) is positive, the expression in
the right-hand side must be positive too. So, this proves the strong link
deletion proofness of the networks in PSt(G).
4.2 Existence of pairwise stable network with transfers
In all game-theoretic problems, one of the primary questions concerns the
existence of equilibria or stable states and strategies. This question in
the framework of network formation translates to the existence of pairwise
stable networks which have been first addressed by Jackson and Watts
(2001). We show that the arguments in Jackson and Watts (2001) and
Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007) can be extended and adapted in our model.
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As a result, we guarantee the existence of pairwise stable network with
transfers in our model.
Definition 7. A cycle C is a set of networks (G1, ..., Gk) that for any pair
of networks Gi, Gj ∈ C, there exists an improving path connecting Gi to Gj.
A cycle C is closed, if for all networks G ∈ C, there does not exist an
improving path leading G to a network G′ /∈ C.
A cycle C is maximal, if it is not a proper subset of a cycle.
While improving paths that start from a seed network may end in an
equilibrium network, it is also possible to find the formation of cycles as
the result of an improving path. Jackson and Watts (2001) showed that in
any network formation model (given a utility function, a set of players, and
network of their connections) there exists either a pairwise stable network
or a closed cycle. Their argument can be adapted for our notion of PSt.
Lemma 2. In the network formation model with transfer payments, there
exists either an equilibrium network from PSt(u) or a closed cycle of net-
works.
Proof. The main idea is based on the fact that in our linking game with
transfers, a network is pairwise stable if and only if it does not lie on
an improving path to any other network. Therefore, if we start at any
seed network, either the outcome of dynamic process is a pairwise stable
network with transfers or the starting network lies on an improving path
to another network. In the first case, the result is established, so consider
the second case. Given the finite number of possible networks, there are
two possibilities by following an improving path. In the first possibility, the
dynamic process ends at some network that has no improving paths leaving
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it, hence it must be a pairwise stable network with transfer. In the second
possibility, the improving path can be continued through each network it
hits, therefore it must form a cycle. As a result, we have established that
there always exists either a pairwise stable network with transfers or a cycle.
To complete the proof, we show that if there are no pairwise stable
networks with transfers, then there must be a closed cycle. Assuming
that there must exist a cycle, given the finite number of networks we can
state that there must exist a maximal cycle. Consider the collection of all
maximal cycles. By the definition of maximal cycle, there must be at least
one such cycle that there is no improving path leaving the cycle. This is
because there can be improving paths leaving some of the maximal cycles,
but these must lead to another maximal cycle. If all maximal cycles had
improving paths leaving them, then there would be a larger cycle, and it
contradicts maximality. Consequently, there exists a closed cycle.
The notion of potential function and in particular, ordinal potential
functions was first introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996). An ordinal
potential game admits an ordinal potential function, given the set of players,
strategies, and utility functions in that game. In particular, Monderer and
Shapley showed that every finite ordinal potential game possesses a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.
Jackson and Watts (2001) and Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007) adapt this
concept for networks and showed the existence of pairwise stable networks
in ordinal network potential games.
Definition 8. A utility function u(.) (u : G → RN) admits an ordinal
network potential, if there exists a function P : G→ R such that for every
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network G ∈ G, every player i ∈ N and every link ij ∈ Li(G):
P(G) > P(G− ij)⇐⇒ ui(G) > ui(G− ij), (4.9)
P(G) < P(G− ij)⇐⇒ ui(G) < ui(G− ij), (4.10)
P(G) = P(G− ij)⇐⇒ ui(G) = ui(G− ij). (4.11)
Theorem 1. In the linking game with direct and indirect transfers given
the utility function in (2.1),
(a) there are no cycles,
(b) there exists at least one pairwise stable network (PSt(u)), and
(c) it admits an ordinal potential function.
Proof. We can rule out the existence of cycles in a network formation model
if we show that the following condition holds: for any two networks G and
G′, G′ defeats G if and only if v(G′) > v(G), also G and G′ are adjacent.
This condition is called exact pairwise monotonicity. We argue that our
linking game with transfers satisfies this condition. Since, as a result of
direct and indirect transfer payments, creation and severance of any link
on an improving path do not hurt any player’s utility. In particular, when
player i establishes link ij, pairwise stability with transfers implies that it
will not hurt player j. Moreover, the payoff function implies that the link
addition by other players cannot hurt a player’s utility, if this link is not
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incident with the player. In the case of link severance, the indirect transfer
payments cover any potential utility gap for other players that used the
deleted links in the distance computations in their payoff. Conversely, if G
and G′ are adjacent in an improving path such that v(G′) > v(G), G′ must
defeat G. To complete the proof, suppose there exists a cycle, hence there
is some G such that it has an improving path to itself. However, the exact
pairwise monotonicity makes it impossible. Ruling out the existence of
cycles along with Lemma 2 guarantees the existence of at least one pairwise
stable network with transfer payments.
Finally, P(G) = v(G) =
∑n
i=1 ui(G) is an ordinal potential function for
our linking game.
Moreover, the previous argument also provides complementary expla-
nations for the existence of link stable networks in the extension with
forbidding returning links in chapter 3.
4.3 Convergence to pairwise Nash stability
We have shown the network outcomes of the dynamic process in our game
surely belong to the set of pairwise stable networks with transfers. In this
section, we show that these network outcomes are in fact pairwise-Nash
stable, since they satisfy the necessary and sufficient condition (based on
Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic (2009)) for the equivalency of two sets PSt(u)
and PNSt(u), given the definition of utility function in (2.1). This brings
the convergence of the dynamic process in our game to pairwise Nash stable
networks.
The following proposition targets the simple observation that given
α-submodular utility functions, if a player does not benefit from severing
32
any single link, then she does not benefit from simultaneously cutting any
group of links as well.
Proposition 3. Given the utility function u(.) in (2.1), PSt(u) = PNSt(u).
Proof. Theorem 1 in Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic (2009) shows the equiva-
lency of P (u) and PNS(u), given a utility function that is α-submodular.
A similar argument can be adapted to our linking game with transfers
as well. According to Definition 3, it is clear that PNSt(u) ⊆ PSt(u). We
show it also holds that PSt(u) ⊆ PNSt(u). Since this is intuitive when
PSt(u) = ∅, let assume PSt(u) 6= ∅. First, we take network G∗ that is
pairwise stable in linking game with transfers and define φ(G∗, u) as
φ(G∗, u) ∈ min {mui(G∗, ij) | ij ∈ G, i ∈ N} .
In pairwise stable networks, all marginal utilities from return of any link
(mui(G
∗, ij)) must be positive. Therefore by α-submodularity of u(.) we
can show that for all li(G
∗) ⊆ Li(G∗),mui(G∗, li(G∗)) ≥ 0. This implies the
Nash stability for G∗ according to Inequality (2.2). In addition, according
to the definition of PSt networks, for each link ij /∈ Li(G∗), we can infer
that the utility function of both players i and j in G∗ + ij is smaller that
their utility in G∗. Hence, G∗ is immune by addition of a single link and
deletion of multiple links or G∗ ∈ PNSt(u).
It remains to show that if the utility function in G∗ ∈ PSt(u) is not
α−submodular, then G∗ /∈ PNSt(u). Since G∗ is not α−submodular, it
can be implied that there is a set li(G
∗) ⊆ Li(G∗) such that the marginal
utility of its deletion from G∗ is negative. This directly proves that G∗
cannot be in PNSt(u).
33
4.4 Small diameter in equilibrium networks
We take a large-scale
√
n×√n grid as the seed network in this model. In
order to prove the main result for the diameter of the equilibrium networks,
it is necessary to provide the following lemmas. Let TG(t)(i, j) be the set of
players that use link ij in their shortest paths to i in the network G(t).
TG(t)(i, j) = {∀k ∈ N | dG(t)(i, j) = dG(t)(i, k) + dG(t)(j, k)}
Lemma 3. Let G(t) be an equilibrium network and i, j ∈ N be an arbitrary
pair of players in this network. If ij /∈ G(t) then
|TG(t)(i, j)|<
dG(t)(i, j)
α + cij + t
i
ij
dG(t)(i, j)− 1 .
Proof. Since i and j are not linked in the equilibrium network, the benefit
of establishing ij has to be less than its linking costs for i and j. On
the other hand, TG(t)(i, j) represents the set of players that creates a part
of this benefit by reducing the distance dG(t)(i, j) between i and j to 1.
Hence, we can state that paying dG(t)(i, j)
α + cij + t
i
ij, which is necessary
for establishing ij, cannot be beneficial for player i. As a result,
|TG(t)(i, j)|(dG(t)(i, j)− 1) < dG(t)(i, j)α + cij + tiij.
Remark 1. For any i, j ∈ N , cji can denote an upper bound for the direct
transfer payment tiij. Hence, if c = max∀i,j∈N(cjk), it is an upper bound for
any direct transfer payment in the network.
In the case of Lemma 3, since the transfer is considered for link creation,
this demand must be equal to u−ijj (G)− u−ijj (G+ ij), where
u−ijj (G)− u−ijj (G+ ij) < cji −
∑
k 6=i (dG(i, k)− dG+ij(i, k)) < cji.
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Consequently, the maximum maintenance cost c in the network is an upper
bound for the direct transfer payments in the game.
Lemma 4. Let Sdi = {∀k ∈ N | dG(t)(i, k) ≤ d}, where G(t) is an equilib-
rium network and i ∈ N . Then,
|Sdi |(1 +
dα + 2c
d− 1 ) ≥ n, where c = max∀i,j∈N(cij).
Proof. The set Sdi consists of players in the neighborhood of i within a
distance at most d. Furthermore, for each of these players such as k in the
set Sdi , according to Lemma 3, we consider the set TG(t)(i, k). All players
outside of this set should use one of players like k in their shortest path to
i. As a result, we can cover all players outside the set Sdi by allocating a
set TG(t)(i, k) to i for all players in set S
d
i . By doing so, an upper bound of
|TG(t)(i, k)||Sdi |+|Sdi | for the number players in network (n) is achieved.
In order to obtain an upper bound for the set TG(t)(i, k) in wide range
of different possible choices for i and k, we define c to be the maximum
maintenance cost for all possible links in network. According to Remark 1,
this is an upper bound for the all possible direct transfer payments in network
as well, hence, |TG(t)(i, k)|≤ d
α + 2c
d− 1 . By substituting the upper bounds of
TG(t)(i, k) and S
d
i in |TG(t)(i, k)||Sdi |+|Sdi |≥ n, the desired inequality can be
achieved.
Lemma 5 shows an upper bound for the set |S2i | that is the next step.
Lemma 5. |S2i |≤ ∆α + 2c
/
k
(
∆−
(
h1 + h2(g1 + 2) + h3(2f1 + f2 + 3)
))
where
0 < f1 + f2 + f3 = g1 + g2 = h1 + h2 + h3 = 1, and 0 ≤ k, fi, gi, hi ≤ 1.
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Proof. Let G be an arbitrary instance from the set of equilibrium networks
in our model, which are the set of pairwise stable networks with transfer
(G ∈ PSt(u)), given the utility function u(.) in (2.1). Also, let t be the
the profile of strategies for players that forms G. Further, assume that the
largest distance between any two players (or diameter) in network G exists
between two players i and j. We denote ∆ to be the size this distance. Note
that the pair of i and j is not necessarily unique.
Based on the stable state, we can imply that creation ij is not beneficial
for neither i nor j. If j wants to establish a link to i, the left side of
Inequality (4.13) is a lower bound for the j’s benefit that comes from the
reduced distances to players in S2i . This set includes i itself and two subsets
of players that are in distance 1 (type 1) and 2 (type 2) from i. First, let k
represents players in S2i such that their distances to j can be reduced by
adding ij, as a fraction with respect to all players in |S2i |. Moreover, let h1
represents player i itself as a fraction with respect to all players in |S2i |. By
establishing ij, j’s distance to i reduced by ∆− 1.
Furthermore, let h2 and h3 represent the fractions of the number of type
1 players and type 2 players, respectively, in S2i . Their reduced distances
for j is computed according to the initial distances of these two types of
players in S2i from j. Among the type 1 players, there are two subsets of
players that g1 and g2 are their fractions with distance of ∆− 1 and ∆ from
j, respectively. Furthermore, in type 2 players, there are three subsets of
players in terms of their distance from j with fractions of f1, f2, f3 that are
in distance of ∆− 2,∆− 1,∆ from j, respectively.
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(4.12)
k|S2i |
(
h1(∆− 1) + h2
(
g1(∆− 3) + g2(∆− 2)
)
+ h3
(
f1(∆− 5)
+ f2(∆− 4) + f3(∆− 3)
))
≤ ∆α + cji + tjij ≤ ∆α + 2c
(4.13)=⇒ |S2i |≤ ∆α + 2c
/
k
(
∆−
(
h1 + h2(g1 + 2) + h3(2f1 + f2 + 3)
))
where
0 < f1 + f2 + f3 = g1 + g2 = h1 + h2 + h3 = 1, and 0 ≤ k, fi, gi, hi ≤ 1.
Theorem 2. For a sufficiently large network, there is a small diameter of
at most 4 for any equilibrium network in the dynamic link-pricing model
with transfer payments.
Proof. Based on our statements in Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we can imply
that
n ≤ (1 + 2α + 2c)(∆α + 2c)
/
k
(
∆−
(
h1 +h2(g1 + 2) +h3(2f1 + f2 + 3)
))
.
(4.14)
For sufficiently large network, when the diameter is greater than bh1 +
h2(g1 + 2) + h3(2f1 + f2 + 3)c, it contradicts Inequality (4.14).
Clearly we can specify that 3 ≤ 2f1 + f2 + 3 ≤ 5 and 2 ≤ g1 + 2 ≤ 3.
Thus in this case, the upper bound for the diameter is the weighted average
of 1, 2f1 + f2 + 3 and g1 + 2 and it is surely smaller than 5.
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5. Simulations
The simulations that we carried out indicate that even a relaxed version of
our model generates small-world networks. In particular, these networks
show (i) a small diameter of at most 4, (ii) a high clustering coefficient,
(iii) a power-law degree distribution, and (iv) the appearance of hubs. The
dynamical simulations are implemented on a grid with n = 900. At each
iteration of the dynamic process, two players i (the initiator) and j (the
responder), are chosen uniformly at random. Then, with probability 1/2,
player i considers establishing a link to j (if ij /∈ G) and with probability 1/2,
she considers severing her link to j (if ij ∈ G). We implemented the dynamic
link-pricing and defined a constant maintenance cost c in these simulations.
Also, we used the notion of link stability in the model of Even-Dar and
Kearns (2007) without considering the transfer payments for technical
reasons. It is important to note that by using the dynamic link-prices,
the emergence of a small diameter 4 can be also proved in the link stable
networks. This can be implied from our argument in Theorem 2.17
In many instances of our simulations, it can be seen in Fugure 5.1
that the degree distribution is a good estimation for the power-law degree
distributions in the real-life social networks.
Figures 5.1 shows the impact of parameters c and α on the degree
17Note that although the existence of stable networks and convergence to the Nash
outcomes is not guaranteed in this assumption, we achieved a set of link stable networks.
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Figure 5.1: The degree distributions of networks, achieved in the simulations.
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distributions of resulting networks. The larger plots are the distributions
where their vertical axis is the probability for degrees and their horizontal
axis determines different values for degree of nodes. The smaller plots are
the log-log plots of these distributions. Their vertical axis is logarithm of the
number or frequency for nodes with different values of degrees. Moreover,
the appearance of few high degree nodes represents the hubs in these
networks.
Figure 5.2: The average clustering coefficients of networks, achieved in the
simulations.
Figure 5.2 demonstrates the clustered structure of link stable networks: a
high average clustering coefficient is present in all instances after increasing
the maintenance cost from c = 1. The high clustering in these networks can
be highlighted further by pointing out their small edge-density in the range
from 0.007 for the network with c = 50, α = 5 to 0.069 for the network
with c = 1 and α = 1. The diameter in all instances was either 3 or 4 as
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expected.
We implemented our simulations with systems of SHARCNET, a provider
of high performance computers for Canadian academic institutions. Our
programing code is provided in the Appendix. A high-level pseudo-code is
also presented in following.
foreach maintenance c in [0,50]
foreach α in [0.5,5]
foreach 5 trials for different sets of α and c
create and name report and print files
create a 30× 30 undirected grid as the seed network
do{
choose uniformly at random two numbers from 900 nodes for i
and j
choose uniformly at random a number between 0 or 1
compute the link-price of ij by dynamic link-pricing
if (0 is chosen and forming ij is beneficial for i) then
add link ij to network
report in files
elseif (1 is chosen and severing ij is beneficial for i)
severe link ij from network
report in files
else
add to the consecutive random meetings with no change in network
}
while (there are less than 5 × 900 random meetings with no
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changes18)
18Based on our observations, after around five times of network size consecutive
random meetings with no changes, no further change has been reported.
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6. Hierarchical networks
We analyze a hierarchical network formation in this chapter. This model is
constructed by taking a tree as the seed network in our linking game with
transfer payments. Hierarchical or tree-based networks are known as another
credible social structures based on observations in social sciences as noted by
Watts et al. (2002). These networks locate players in terms of a topic-based
taxonomy that come from the identities and networks ties of individuals.
In particular, Watts et al. (2002) and Kleinberg (2001) have studied the
property of searchability among hierarchical social networks in attempts
to analyze the small world phenomenon following Milgrams experiment.
While these works apply stochastic structures for link establishments, less
is known from the strategic perspective. In fact, it can be seen that there
is a gap in constructing a decentralized game-theoretic model in order to
study the formation of hierarchical social networks. We aim to fill this gap
by presenting our network formation model with transfer payments. Our
arguments in the first three sections of Chapter 4: (i) the equivalency of
networks in P ∗(u) and PSt(u), (ii) the existence of pairwise stable networks
in the transfer game, and (iii) the pairwise Nash stability of pairwise stable
networks in the transfer game, can be directly applied to the hierarchical
networks as well. This is because these arguments do not rely on the
structure of the seed network of the model. In this chapter, we provide
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our analysis and results for the diameter of equilibrium networks in the
hierarchical network formation model.
6.1 The model
Typically, in tree-based networks, individuals are located at the lowest level
of a complete b-ary tree. The hierarchy is divided into layers such that the
top layers represent the global sets in the network. The hierarchy divides
and continues to go deeper and face the larger numbers of branches and
individuals at the lowest level. It is important to note that the specific
structure of tree-based networks bring some differences in the setup of
model.
The only difference in the cost structures relates to the link-prices.
Kleinberg’s stochastic model in (Kleinberg, 2001) provides a probability
function for each link creations that grows asymptotically in form of b−αd,
where b is the division factor of tree, α is the parameter of model, and d
denotes the distance for the link. Similar to the grid-based model, we would
like to draw a meaningful relation between the distance of two individuals
and the cost of purchasing a link between them. Therefore, we define the
link-price between players u and v to be bαdG(u,v). In the case of fixed
link-pricing, distances are elicited solely from the initial structure of tree,
G0. However, the case of dynamic link-pricing uses the distance of players
in the current evolved network G(t).
Another difference in tree-based networks concerns the distances among
players. Typically in these networks, distance of each two players is defined
to be the height of their lowest common ancestor in the tree. Since we
have a total of n players in a complete b-ary tree, the upper bound or the
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maximum distance between two players in this tree is logb n.
Starting from the seed tree, the structure of network during the dynamics
of our linking game with transfers changes. Hence, we define the distance
of any two player u and v as follows.
dG(u, v) = min{(δ(u, x1) + δ(x1, x2) + · · ·+ δ(xk−1, xk) + δ(xk, v)), the
height of lowest common ancestor of u and v}
for x1, . . . , xk such that players that are used in the shortest path between
u and v according to below statement.
δ(xi, xi+1) =

height of lowest common ancestor if xixi+1 /∈ G(t)
1 otherwise
Let u and v be two arbitrary players in the tree with distance d. If
player u considers the establishment of link uv, she can gain benefit of
reduced distances not only from those players like w in the neighborhood
of v (type i), but also player u can see a reduction in the distances to some
neighbors of w which formed a link to w during the game (type ii). In other
words, the participant players in type i come from the static side of game
and the players in type ii are formed during the dynamics of the game. We
can accurately compute the benefit function that come from the players in
type i based on the the structure of seed tree as follows:
d− 1 + (b− 1)(
d−1∑
i=2
bi−2(d− i)) = b
d−1 − 1
b− 1 (6.1)
It is worthy of note that the decision for creating a link at the beginning
of the game depends only on the gained benefit from the players in type i.
As a result, we can determine the criteria for the parameter α that
allows the network formation game to progress. This criteria is achieved by
satisfying Inequality (6.2) that indicates the condition for a link creation at
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the beginning of the game.
(
bd−1 − 1
b− 1 ) ≥ b
αd+cuv+t
u
uv =⇒ 1 ≥
bαd(b− 1)
bd−1 − 1 +
(cuv + t
u
uv)(b− 1)
bd−1 − 1 (6.2)
Furthermore, at the beginning of the game, it is necessary for establishing
any link such as uv that tuuv ≥ 0 as well as tvuv ≥ 0.
Now, we should find the choice of linkage that provides the largest
possible increase in the the utility for the initiator. In the case of α ≤ 1,
with respect to Inequality (6.2), the largest utility can be achieved for the
most distant choices, d = logb n. By using this distance in Inequality (6.2),
we reach to the below Inequality (6.3). It can be seen that for the case of
α < 1, given a sufficiently large size of network (n), Inequality (6.3) and
consequently Inequality (6.2) are satisfied.
1 ≥ b
α logb n(b− 1)
blogb n−1 − 1 +
(cuv + t
u
uv)(b− 1)
blogb n−1 − 1 =⇒
0 ≥ (b2 − b)nα − n+ (cuv + tuuv)(b2 − b) + b (6.3)
However, when α = 1, Inequality (6.3) cannot be satisfied with the large
size of n. In the last case, when α > 1, the largest possible utility from link
creations can be achieved for the shortest existing links (d = 2). By setting
d = 2 in Inequality (6.2), we can observe that finding a beneficial choice
is not possible in this case as well. Therefore, the eligible domain for the
parameter α in this model is 0 < α < 1.
Given this eligible domain, the following theorem shows that the hier-
archical model generates small diameter networks with the threshold of
α = 1/4.
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Theorem 3. In any equilibrium network in the both cases of fixed and
dynamic link-pricing, when α ≤ 1/4, the diameter is at most two.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium network G and two players u, v ∈ N in which
the distance between them in G is equal to the diameter, dG(u, v) = ∆. Thus,
these two players are not willing to pay the required cost for establishing
link uv. Further, we introduce the two sets S1u and T
d
i,j that are useful in
constructing our proof. The set S1u contains u and its neighbors in G(t).
The set T di,j contains the participant players in the benefit of establishing a
link from i to j with distance d = dG(i, j) when this choice of linkage is not
beneficial. Also, the participation of these players means that creating a link
from i to j decreases their distances to i. We summarize the benefit of this
link creation as the statement in the left side of Inequality (6.4). Moreover,
B that is a lower bound for the reduced distances (after establishing ij) by
each player in this set. Intuitively B ≥ 1.
|T di,j|B ≤ bαd + cij + tiij (6.4)
We want to cover the total number of players in the network (n) and
build an upper bound for the size n. For each player such as u′ ∈ S1u, we
allocate |Tu′,Wu′ | number of players such as w to the player u′ such that
w /∈ S1u and dG(u′, w) ≥ 2. This allocation must satisfy Inequality (6.5).
|S1u|(1 + |Tu′,Wu′ |) ≥ n (6.5)
Wu′ = {w | w /∈ S1u, dG(u′, w) ≥ 2}
Tu′,Wu′ =
∑
w∈Wu′ Tu′,w
Consider w /∈ S1u, because of the distance structures in the hierarchical
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networks, we cannot state that w surely uses one of the nodes in the set S1u
in her shortest path to u. This is because the distance between w and u may
be defined from the initial hierarchical structure of the network. Therefore,
in order to construct an upper bound for n, we should allocate a set Tu′,w
to u′ for several nodes like w such that w ∈ Wu′ . This is as opposed to our
similar construction in the grid-based model in Lemma 4 that shows one of
the main differences in these two models.
Players such as w have different distances in the range of [2,∆] from u′.
In addition, according to Figure 6.1, we can point out that by creation a
link from u′ to w all players with distance of at most x =
⌊
dG(u
′,w)
2
⌋
−1 from
w participate in the benefit of this linkage. This is because, dG(u
′, w) ≤
dG(u
′, w′) + x. In addition, after creation the link u′w, by considering
the closest possible player w to player u′, it can be implied that 1 + x <
dG(u
′, w) − x. According to the structure of seed tree, Inequality (6.6)
shows a lower bound for the number of players that their distances to u′
are decreased by creation of link u′w.
b
⌊
dG(u
′,w)
2
⌋
−1
(6.6)
We can simply assume a lower bound of one for the amount of reduced
distances from players in the set Tu′,w or B. Consequently, it can be implied
that if we repeat this enumeration “k” times for every such player u′, we
can build an upper bound for the statement |Tu′,Wu′ |.
Although the largest distance in the lower bound in Inequality (6.6) can
be in practical less than the diameter, we can achieve an upper bound by
applying k|T∆u′,w|. To compute an upper bound for k, note that n− b players
must be covered, since b is a lower bound for |S1u|. We do this allocation for
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Figure 6.1: Farthest player which participates in the benefit from creating link
u′w, where x = dG(w′, w).
each u′ ∈ S1u by having at least b players in set S1u, therefore the outcome
for an upper bound of k can be divided by b. As a result, k =
n− b
bb∆2 c
.
The next step is building an upper bound for |S1u|. Let us consider again
two players of u and v that are at the distance ∆ in a pairwise stable network
with transfers. Therefore, without loss of generality, it is not beneficial for v
to establish a link to u. This is noted in Inequality (6.7), where its left side
represents a lower bound for the benefit of player v in establishing link uv
by considering the reduced distances from players in the set S1u to player v.
There are two types of players in the set S1u in terms of having distance ∆
and ∆− 1 from v and also these players can have new updated distance 1
or 2 from v after creation a link between u and v. As a result, there are
three cases of ∆− 1,∆− 2, and ∆− 3 for players in S1u to participate in
the benefit of linkage from u to v.
In below inequality, the upper bounds for maintenance costs and direct
transfer payments are considered according to Remark 1.
|S1u|
(
f1(∆− 1) + f2(∆− 2) + f3(∆− 3)
)
≤ bα∆ + 2c
=⇒ |S1u|
(
∆− (f1 + 2f2 + 3f3)
)
≤ bα∆ + 2c (6.7)
with f1 + f2 + f3 = 1, 0 < fi < 1
where fi is the fraction of players with one the above-mentioned possibilities
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in the reduced distances.
Now, we can achieve an upper bound for the left side of Inequality (6.5)
as follows:
( bα∆ + 2c
∆− (f1 + 2f2 + 3f3)
)(
1 + (
n− b
bb∆2 c
)(
bα∆ + 2c
B
)
)
≥ n (6.8)
We want to demonstrate that there exists a contradiction for Inequality
(6.8) for α ≤ 1/4, unless we disregard this inequality by setting the diameter
of network to an amount smaller than f1 + 2f2 + 3f3. By setting the
maximum possible amount for the diameter of network; which is ∆ =
logb (n), we can compute the magnitude of n
2α+1/2 for the left side statement
in Inequality (6.8). As a result, given a sufficiently large amount for the
size of network (n) and α ≤ 1/4, any distance bigger than f1 + 2f2 + 3f3
clearly contradicts with Inequality (6.8).
In case of α = 1/4, it can be observed that coefficient of n in the left
side of above inequality is less than one, therefore the range is inclusive
of 1/4. Nonetheless, this contradiction is based on the fact that we assume
the diameter of network is bigger than f1 + 2f2 + 3f3. This expression is
the weighted average of 1, 2, and 3 and hence it is definitely smaller than
3. As a result, the largest value the diameter can take is 2. Since, we
referred to the structure of seed tree for computing the upper bound of bα∆
in our argument, this result is applied for both cases of fixed and dynamic
link-pricing.
6.2 Hierarchical networks with groups
We can generalize the tree-based model by considering the existence of
a group of players with mean size “g” in each leaf of the tree instead of
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single individuals. We take the following assumptions for this generalization.
First, the distance of each two players in a group is equal to zero. Second, if
one player establishes a link, then other players in both groups of initiator
and responder can use that link. These assumptions help us to simplify
the computations and to derive results comparative to the previous part.
Note that in this extension, the maximum distance in the tree is logb
n
g
.
The eligible range for α from the previous part can be applied here as well.
Also, our result in Theorem 3 for the threshold of α = 1/4 is valid in this
generalization.
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7. Conclusions and Further Research
In this thesis, we formulated large-scale networks in a game-theoretic fashion.
In our grid-based model with dynamic link-pricing, we showed that all
equilibrium networks have small diameter of at most 4 for all range of
α > 0. Moreover, we considered a maintenance cost for existing links that
enables player to sustain their direct links and also make the link severance
well-defined. We proved the ability of players to put transfer payments
on links guarantees the emergence of stable outcomes or pairwise stable
networks with transfers for the dynamic process in our model.
We showed that the stronger notion of strictly pairwise stability is
satisfied in the pairwise stable networks with transfers. Moreover, these
networks are immune under the higher degree of stability that is pairwise
Nash stability with transfers. In conclusion, we achieved a strategic or
game-theoretic mechanism and model and a dynamic process in which
firstly, the outcomes of individuals’ interactions are guaranteed to exist and
to be well-founded, and secondly, our model generates large-scale networks
that benefit from a rational and strategic microfoundation and demonstrate
the main characterization of small degree of separation in real-life social
networks.
Moreover, we constructed a hierarchical network formation model by
changing the structure of seed graph to a complete b-ary tree. We showed the
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existence of a small diameter in both cases of fixed and dynamic link-pricing
with the threshold of α = 1/4.
To continue the directions of study in this line of research, there are some
natural extensions of the problem that we can mention. It is interesting to
consider some natural restrictions that individuals may consider in reality
(e.g. potential limits on the degrees of connections) and study their impact
on the analysis of model. In another extension, the structural characteristics
of networks can be studied under the assumption of having some farsighted
or forward-looking players, who can forecast the future of the network.
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Appendix: C++ code
# include <stdio.h>
# include <Snap.h>
# include <iostream>
# include <sstream>
# include <fstream>
# include <string>
# include <iostream>
# include <math.h>
# include <ctime>
# include <stdlib.h>
using namespace std;
// compute total distances to all nodes for the chosen node
template<class PGraph>
int comp_tot_dist(PGraph G, int node){
int dist = 0;
for(TUNGraph::TNodeI NI1=G->BegNI();NI1<G->EndNI();NI1++){
int id = NI1.GetId();
dist=dist+TSnap::GetShortPath<PUNGraph>(G,node,id,false);
}// end for
return dist;
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}// check that whether total distances from all nodes
// before adding (after removing) the edge "ij" ("dist"
// variable) is large enough, so "ij" is (no longer)
// beneficial for "i".
// in_dist: input variable that shows the total distances
// to all nodes for "i" after adding (before removing)
// edge "ij".
template <class PGraph>
bool checkfunc(PGraph G,int node,double link_cost,int in_dist){
int dist = 0;
TUNGraph::TNodeI NI1 = G->BegNI();
do{
int id = NI1.GetId();
dist=dist+TSnap::GetShortPath<PUNGraph>(G,node,id,false);
NI1++;
} // end do
while((dist-in_dist<=link_cost)&&(NI1<G->EndNI()));
if (dist-in_dist > link_cost){
return true;
}else
return false;
}
//***********************************************************
int main (int argc, char const *argv[]){
// two ’for’ loops : repeat the simulation (5 trials)
// given the different set of values for the two key
// parameters: alpha and c (the fixed maintenance cost)
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for (int c = 0; c <= 50; c+=10){
for(double alpha = 0.5; alpha<=5; alpha+=0.5){
int trial = 1;
while(trial!=6){
// setup for naming the output (txt) files
// file: keeps the edge additions and deletions.
// report: keeps the number of consecutive random
// meetings without any change during the simulation,
// in order to evaluate the stability of the outcomes.
stringstream s1;
s1 << c;
const std::string tmp = s1.str();
const char* pchar1 = tmp.c_str();
argv[1] = pchar1;
stringstream s2;
s2 << alpha;
const std::string tmp1 = s2.str();
const char* pchar2 = tmp1.c_str();
argv[2] = pchar2;
// create an undirected n*n grid graph
int n = 30;
PUNGraph G = TSnap::GenGrid<PUNGraph>(n, n, false);
// make dynamic file names for the output files
ofstream file;
ofstream report;
ostringstream fname,rname;
fname<<"c="<<c<<"alpha="<<alpha<<"r="<<trial<<".txt";
file.open(fname.str().c_str());
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rname<<"rep"<<"c="<<c<<"alpha="<<alpha<<"r="<<trial<<".txt";
report.open(rname.str().c_str());
// i,j: indexes for choosing initiator (i) and
// responder (j) nodes
int i=0, j=0, randNum = 0;
// keep the total distances from all nodes for
// the acting node (i)
int total_dist=0;
// keep the distance between two nodes "i" and
// j in the current graph
int distance = 0;
double linkprice = 0;
// keep the number of consecutive random
// meetings with no change in graph
int endrand = 0;
// check whether a link creation or link
// severance is happened in each random
// meeting (ture) or not (false)
bool flag = false;
// setup for generating random numbers
srand (time(0));
if(file.is_open()){
do{
// generate two random integers from the nodes’ id
// for the initiator node (i) and responder node
// (j) in each random meeting
i = (int) ( (n*n) * (rand() / (RAND_MAX + 1.0)));
j = (int) ( (n*n) * (rand() / (RAND_MAX + 1.0)));
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// take the note with id "i"
TUNGraph::TNodeI NI = G->GetNI(i);
// generate a random integer between zero and
// one so as to consider edge creation (zero) or
// edge severance (one)
randNum = (int) ( 2 * (rand() / (RAND_MAX + 1.0)));
// compute the dynamic link-price for "ij"
distance=TSnap::GetShortPath<PUNGraph>(G,i,j,false);
linkprice= pow(distance, alpha);
// with probability 1/2, "i" considers establishing
// an edge to j, if "ij" does not exist
if((randNum==0)&&(!G->IsEdge(i,j))&&(i!=j)){
G->AddEdge(i,j);
// total distances after adding the "ij"
total_dist=comp_tot_dist(G,i);
// again consider the graph before adding the new edge
G->DelEdge(i,j);
// check for establishing edge "ij"
if( checkfunc(G,i,linkprice+c,total_dist) ){
G->AddEdge(i,j);
file<<i <<" "<< j <<endl;
// declare a change in this random meeting
flag=true;
report<<endrand<<endl;
// declare a change in this random meeting
endrand = 0;
}// end if
// with probability 1/2, "i" considers severing
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// her edge "j" (if "ij" exists)
}// end for
else if ( (randNum == 1) && (NI.IsNbrNId(j))){
// total distances before deleting the "ij"
total_dist=comp_tot_dist(G,i);
G->DelEdge(i,j);
if (!checkfunc(G,i,c,total_dist)){
// declare a change in this random meeting
flag=true;
report<<endrand<<endl;
// declare a change in this random meeting
endrand = 0;
file <<"remove " <<i <<" "<< j <<endl;
}// end if
else
G->AddEdge(i,j);
}// end else if
if(flag==false){
// count the number of random meetings with
// no change in graph
endrand++;
}// end if
flag=false;
}// end do
// condition for continuing the game; maximum number
// of random meeting without any change
while( endrand!=5*n*n );
file <<"---end of simulation---"<<endl;
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} // end if, close the file
trial++;
}// end the five trials
} // end alpha’s ’for’ loop
} // end c’s ’for’ loop
return 0;
}// end main
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